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iiAbstract
There is a growing consensus  among development  practitioners that participatory
mechanisms are necessary  in securing the success of development projects. Through the lens
of social funds this paper looks at the concept social capital in order to explain why
participation is crucial for development outcomes. Two hypotheses are stated regarding the
causalities between social capital and project sustainability. On the background of a
definition of social capital different operationalizations are reviewed in order to propose a
methodological  approach for testing the hypotheses.
iiiIForeword
The World Bank has supported more than 40 social funds in most Regions of the world; they
have become important instruments in the World Bank's increasing support for Social
Protection. Operational experience  has shown that one of the benefits of these operations is
increased capacity in communities  to demand and manage development funds. At the same
time as the operational experience is coming in the World Bank is gradually getting more and
more interested in the concept of social capital.
This paper proposes a way of defining social capital that is operationally  relevant and
explores theoretically the potential links between social funds and social capital. The paper
demonstrates that a simple definition of social capital is probable better to use for operational
purposes and proposes a strategy for measuring social capital as it relates to social funds.
The paper is one of several background papers being prepared for the World Bank's Social
Protection Sector Strategy Paper, which will outline the analytical  concepts behind social
protection and define an operational strategy for the World Bank's support for social
protection initiatives.
Steen Jorgensen
Sector Manager, Social Protection
Human Development Network
ivI  WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL?
The term social capital can be traced back to the nineteenth-century,  where the Italian
Risorgimento  movement  conceptualized  valor sociale as the educative feature of the growvth
and practice of self-governing  institutions (Hyden, 1997, p. 5).' But, it was the work of
Robert Putnam on the differences in government  performance and economic development
between North- and South-Italy that really brought the concept back into social science and
initiated a large amount of research into it (Putnam, 1993).
The number of articles about social capital approaches  the number of different definitions of
the concept. So, one major challenge in building a theory of social capital is to develop a
definition around which consensus between social scientists will develop. In this paper a
simple definition of social capital is claimed and by an illustrative game-theoretic  example it
is clarified which problems we need to solve or mitigate in order to increase the level of
social capital. This is what we call the micro perspective of social capital.
Social capital is influenced by a number of different variables especially the institutional
setting of society. By looking at a diagram illustrating the connection between social capital,
civil society and its associated formal and informal institutions, we sketch the institutional
setting wherein social capital operates. This is what we call the macro perspective of social
capital. The two perspectives help to clarify what we are talking about  when we are talking
about social capital. Additionally, it raises a number of questions, which need to be answered
in order to increase our understanding of social capital. Secondly, this paper will present the
organizational setup of social funds and demonstrate  the importance  of social capital for the
sustainability of social funds projects, and the workings of sustainability  in reinforcing the
accumulation of social capital. Thirdly, we present a review of the research initiatives on
1social capital taken by the World Bank. Finally, we will look at different ways of measuring
social capital and try to figure out which of them can possibly be applied in a social fund
setting.
1.1  THE  DEFINITION
This paper defines social capital in informal terrns as trust influencing collective action. For
this definition to be of any use there is a need to find out what is meant by the term trust.
Dasgupta (1997) defines trust as expectations about the actions of others that have a bearing
on ones own choice of action, when that action is chosen without observing the actions of
those others. The following section will discuss why it is reasonable to view trust in that
perspective.
1.2  THE MICRO PERSPECTIVE
Figure 1 illustrates a game of trust when trust is looked at from a micro perspective. An agent
entering into a transaction and deciding whether or not to trust the opponent is called a
trustor (TI), while an opponent who decides whether or not to keep to the trust is called a
trustee (T2). Let us assume that TI is choosing her action before that of T2 and that T2 is
able to observe that action, i.e., we have a sequential  garre. 2 The choice of TI is whether to
trust or to monitor the actions of T2. If she monitors, the game ends and both players receive
the payoff 0. If she trusts the move goes to T2, which chooses either to honor the trust of Ti
and act trustworthy or to cheat on TI and act opportunistically.  If T2 plays opportunistic, she
gets the pay-off b, while T I receives the pay-off a; if T2 acts trustworthy both players obtain
the pay-off 1.
Valor sociale is an Italian  termi  roughly translating into social capital.
2 Both simultaneous  and sequential  games can illustrate the problems relatin, to trust.





The trust problem can be illustrated by Figure 1. If a < 0 and b > 1 we have the well-known
prisoner's dilemma game where the only equilibrium (when both players are rational) is for
TI to monitor. The problem is that this outcome is Pareto dominated by the situation where
Ti trusts and T2 honors that trust and acts trustworthy. This problem will be referred to as the
trust problem. 3
The question is what causes the trust problem? Or, asked in another way, what makes TI
choose the strategy of monitoring? The problem is that T2 can possibly play opportunistic. If
b > 1, T2 has an incentive to play opportunistic, while if b < 1, T2 has the incentive to play
trustworthy. T2's incentives are clearly a function of the pay-offs. So, Ti chooses to monitor,
because otherwise T2 will have an incentive to cheat on her and play opportunistic.  This
cause of the trust problem will be referred to as the incentive problem.
Consider another scenario of the game in Figure 1. Here there are two types of T2 players,
trustees (type 1) and opportunists (type 2). The opportunists have a pay-off b > 1, while the
trustees have a pay-off b < 1. So with no uncertainty about the type of player, the outcome of
the game will be the Pareto optimum (1,1) when TI faces a trustee and the inefficient
3The  trust problem can also be illustrated by coordination games, but the PD game is excellent as an illustrator,
because the Pareto-solution is not an equilibrium.
3outcome (0,0) when facing an opportunist. The problem is that in most social interactions, TI
does not know which type she is facing. The way to model this is typically to assign a
probability distribution to a stochastic variable X, where X = The opponent  is of type i. In the
example above we have two different types, so i is equal to either 1 or 2 leading to a discrete
probability distribution. But in principle we could have an indefinite number of types, where
a continuous probability distribution would be the appropriate  one to use. In the example
from Figure 1  let us assignp to the probability that Tl's  opponent is of type 1, i.e., she is a
trustee (X=1). It implies that the probability TI's  opponent is of type 2, i.e., is an opportunist
(X=2), is equal to (f-p). In this scenario we see another cause of the trust problem. Because
TI lacks information  about the possible type of T2 it can lead to the absence of an act of trust
from her side, and the game will thereby end up in the inefficient equilibrium. This cause of
the trust problem will be referred to as the information problem.
Now we move back to the definition of trust and thereby the definition of social capital. Trust
was defined as expectations  about the actions of others that have a bearing on ones own
choice of action, when that action is chosen without observing the actions of those others.
These expectations are due to the incentive and information problem a function of the pay-
offs and of a probability distribution deternining the probability of whether or not one's
opponent is trustworthy. Formally, we have
(1)  SC = T = R(z, p(fX), where
SC is social capital, T is trust influencing collective action, R is expectations about others
actions, 7t  represent the pay-off functions for the players, and p(ik  is the probability
distribution assigned to evaluate the trustworthiness of ones opponents.
In order to increase the level of social capital there is a need for mitigating the information
and the incentive problems. These problems are interlinked. If we change the incentives in a
direction where opportunism pays less, more people will tend to be trustworthy. This will
influence the probability distribution for the variable determining  the probability that one's
opponent is trustworthy.
4Another interesting problem is how social capital accumulates?  In this paper it is claimed that
social capital/trust  accumulates  through some kind of learning process. The process is
illustrated in Figure 2. Agents enter into repeated interactions of the type in Figure 1 with an
initial level of trust. They choose their strategies on the background of expectations and pay-
offs. Then they realize the actual outcomes of these interactions and acquire information
about others behavior. This information  influence agents' expectations about others actions
(e.g., they update the probability distribution p(A)) and thereby the level of trust. The
outcomes of interaction also influence  formal and informal institutions and thereby pay-offs,
a point, which we will return to when looking at social capital from a macro perspective.
These two effects influence  new interactions  and this dynamic process continues over time.
Figure 2 The accumulation  of trust/social capital
|Formal  and 
Informal  -- 
Institutions
Expectations about
others  actions  -------  - -- -----
The level of trust
Expectedi  Benefits  Epce  ot
Outcomes  of
Interaction  .
1.3  THE MACRO PERSPECTIVE
When analyzing  social capital from a macro perspective we must look at the institutional
context wherein it operates.  For this purpose there is a need to state several definitions such
that everyone  knows what we are talking about.
The institutional environmnent  consists of informal and formal institutions and the interplay
between them. North defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society, or the humanly
5devised constraints that structure human interaction (North, 1990, p. 23). These constraints
are the informal and formal institutions, where the informal ones are constituted  by social and
moral nonrns,  and formal institutions are the statute law, common law, and regulations.
Formal institutions are sometimes characterized  as legal norms and are differentiated from
social and moral norrns by its lack of self-enforcement.
In Figure 3 formal institutions are presented in the boxes on the right-hand side while the
informal ones are on the left. Arrows represent the functional relationship between the
institutions. Describing  all the different relationships is a complicated process, but the figure
gives a good illustration of the different factors influencing social capital. It is not the aim of
this paper to explore all these relations, but merely to describe the figure in order to raise
some ideas for future research that can increase our knowledge about social capital.
Figure 3 The institutional  setting
History, Ideology, Leadership  |  ----
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Social  Norms
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Source: Raiser, 1997,  p. 9.
The boxes at the top and the bottom of the figure represent largely exogenous factors to the
institutional environrment.  At the top, history, ideology, and leadership determine the set of
6institutions at a particular point in time. At the bottom preferences and technologies are taken
to be exogenous. They determnine  prices and thereby influence the pay-offs in all interactions.
By this assumption it is implicitly assumed that it is impossible to substitute social capital for
other types of capital and vice versa.
Norms are beliefs about one's own action and/or that of others, which express what action is
right, or what action is wrong (Coleman, 1987, p. 135). Norms thereby influence  people's
strategies. If a person, when evaluating her possible strategies, chooses to abide to a norm,
because violating it, when everybody else abides to it, turns out to be costly for herself, we
will call it a social norm. In game theoretic terms a social norm is enforced because it is an
equilibrium.  A social norm could be; choose to be trustworthy, because if you are not, it will
turn out to be costly for you. It will be costly since everybody  else abiding to the norm will
punish you by not being willing to trust you in future transactions. Look at the game in
Figure lwhen it is of the prisoner's dilemma type (i.e. when a < 0 and b > 1) and repeated an
indefinite  number of times. If the future is not discounted too heavily the trust solution is a
possible equilibrium and can therefore give an explanation of why people stick to a norm. If
the prisoner's dilemma has a final round the only equilibrium is the inefficient monitor-
solution. But, if imperfect information is incorporated  into the game the trust solution again
becomes a possible equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).  Other game settings are possible
in securing  that the trust solution is a possible equilibrium. 4 For social norms to be enforced
non-compliance  must always be detectable.
If a person, when evaluating her possible strategies, chooses to abide to a norm, because the
consequences  for other individuals by non-conformation  impose feelings of guilt and shame
on herself, we will call it a moral norm. Platteau gives some good examples of moral norms
like the Christian principle  that we ought not to do to others what we would not like them to
do to us and the Kantian principle  where one ought to abstain from  any action that would
threaten to disrupt social order were everybody  to undertake  it (Platteau,  1994b, pp. 768-
For an exposition of the literature see Kreps (1990), Gibbons (1992), and Fudenberg,  and Tirole (1991).
7769). The literature on moral norms stems mostly from sociology and anthropology, and it is
definitely a challenge for economists to incorporate  the concept into the analysis of human
behavior.
Civil society consists of all non-governmental  organizations  be it the press, leisure clubs,
churches, neighborhood associations, and so on. Both moral and social norms and its
interplay with civil society can help to mitigate the information  and incentive problems in
human interactions. A social norm creates better incentives for being trustworthy in order to
nurture an agent's reputation for future transactions. A moral norm on the other hand creates
incentives for trustworthiness in order to avoid guilt and shamne  feelings. Civil society creates
a forum where information can be shared and spread. A flourishing  civil society with lots of
connected networks and organizations  can help moral norms and information about others'
trustworthiness to spread, in order to decrease the information shortages and the incentives
for being opportunistic.
On the right-hand side of Figure 3 governance is partly determined by what happened in the
past, i.e., by history, ideology, and leadership. But, it is also influenced by the set of social
and moral norms. Norms against opportunism  and pure self-interest are more likely to create
good governance than if cheating and fraud are unpunished. The causality goes the other way
around too. If government officials and politicians are involved in rent seeking and
corruption leading to bad governance, it will tend to foster non-productive norms. This
causality is illustrated by the dynamics in the figure where the influence of governance on
human interaction feedback's into history, ideology, and leadership and thereby influence the
set of norms. Governance also enforces the laws, rules, and regulations (the legal norms),
which structure economic and social interactions.  The law can help to mitigate incentive and
information  problems by influencing  pay-offs and establishing  technologies revealing the
types of agents.
The success of governance or third-party enforcement  depends on civil society's beliefs
about the sanctioning and monitoring capacities of the government. If agents doubt these
8capacities of the government it is likely that laws trying to solve the trust problem will be
unsuccessful.5  The box in the middle of Figure 3 represents the interface between civil
society and the government. This box illustrates the importance of trust in government
institutions and thereby the importance of trust in the sanctioning and monitoring capacities
of the government.
The boxes for civil society, governance, and the society government interface are all a subset
of the economic and social interactions box, since a lot of interactions  are taking place inside
these three boxes. But, by pulling them out in separate boxes it is easier to illustrate the
workings of the institutional system.
The box for economic and social interaction is essential, since this is where outcomes are
generated and feed back into the system in a dynamic way. This feedback mechanism was
previously illustrated in Figure 2; outcomes are realized effectuating change in institutions
and in people's expectations about others' behavior, i.e., in the level of trust/social capital.
The separate trust-box in Figure 3 illustrates  that the institutional setting and its operation
influence the pay-off function and the probability distribution in equation 1. This is the same
as to say that the institutional setting and its operation influence  the level of social capital.
A lot of the literature on social capital tries to capture all the links in Figure 3. This is a
reasonable approach,  when ones aim is descriptive, or if one wants to explain some empirical
findings. But, if we want to increase our knowledge about social capital we need to look at
the literature on, and perform new research in, the partial processes described  in Figure 3.
There is a need to look into the social capital from a micro perspective as mentioned above,
look at the theory of social and moral norms, and the theory on governance.
Why is social capital important for the workings of economies?  One obvious answer from the
preceding discussion, is that it helps to diminish the incentive and information  problem in
human interaction. This is important, because it lowers transaction costs and help people to
5  For a game theoretic example see Kammersgaard (1998).
9overcome the dilemmas of collective action. Kenneth  Arrow has expressed the importance  of
trust in the following way,
Trust is an important  lubricant  of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves
a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word.... Trust and
similar values....  increase  the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more
goods (Arrow, 1974, p.23)
This chapter has defined the concept social capital and illustrated the problems that need to
be solved in order to increase the level of social capital. Secondly, the institutional
environment wherein social capital operates was presented in order to give an idea of causal
links between different institutions and social capital.  The presentation leads to a lot of
questions which future research must answer in order to increase our knowledge about social
capital.
*  How do we solve or influence the information  and incentive problem and thereby
the level of social capital?
*  Is it possible to model the accumulation  process for social capital?
*  How do institutions influence social capital?
*  Can social capital explain the growth residual?
*  If social capital contributes to economic growth, how do we invest in it?
*  How can we operationalize social capital?
This paper will not try to answer these questions, but the hope is they will inspire researchers
and practitioners to get interested in social capital leading to more research in this very
complex area of social science.
To underline the importance of research in social capital the next chapter will present the
organizational  setup of social funds in order to understand  the connections between social
capital and the effectiveness  of these funds.
10II  SOCIAL FUNDS
In the review of the social funds portfolio, social funds are defined as quasi-financial
intermediaries  that channel resources,  according  to pre-determined  eligibility  criteria, to
small-scale projects for poor  and vulnerable  groups  (World Bank,  1  997a). This chapter
looks at the development  in the primary objective of social funds over the years and presents
the organizational  setup for a typical fund. The organizational setup is then used to illustrate
different levels where social capital works as an important mediator for and a possible by-
product of the workings of social funds. This approach will clarify the links between social
capital and social funds and help to figure out where there is a need for future research.
The first-social  fund was born in 1986  with the Bolivian Emergency Social Fund. It initiated
a new stream of World Bank projects which today (end-fiscal 1996) amount to 3% of the
total number of active Bank projects, amounting to commitments of over 1.3 billion US
dollars.
The primary objective of these social funds has changed over the years. Barrientos and
Jorgensen (1998) divide social funds into three generations on the background of their
change in objectives over time. The first generation of social funds had as its primary
objective to provide employment and income support to people driven into poverty by
economic  crisis. These funds functioned mainly as a complement to the Bank's structural
adjustment  programs. The second generation  of social funds, emerging in the late 1980's and
early 1990's, aimed more at longer term poverty reduction through the provision of social
and economic infrastructure. 6 Then, since the mid 1990's the third generation of social funds
6 Examples of social infrastructure  projects are schools, health posts, latrines, potable water, house connections,
stoves, cultural  centers, old age homes and training centers. Economic infrastructure includes irrigation,
roads, sidewalks,  drainage, environmental sanitation, bridges, and electricity.
11has started to evolve. These funds emphasize participation  by the poor communities receiving
funds (the beneficiaries) in order to develop their organizational capacity.'
This summary of the development in the primary objectives of social funds shows that from
being a mediator reducing the impacts of economic shocks, social funds have turned into an
instrument, which main objective is to help people build local organizational capacity
through their participation in the production of economic and social infrastructure for
themselves. This change is a result of the World Banks greater emphasis on social
development leading to a more participatory approach in development projects (World Bank,
1  997b).
The definition of local organizational  capacity and social capital are very similar. Since social
capital was defined as trust influencing collective action it is easily seen that local
organizational  capacity is heavily influenced  by social capital. The ability of people to work
together, to trust one another, to organize to solve problems, to mobilize resources, to resolve
conflicts, and to network with others are influenced  by the level of trust. It is thereby clear
that the main objectives of social funds today are to build social capital and create sustainable
infrastructure  that can help people move away from poverty. These two main objectives must
be seen as criteria's for the success of social funds from the viewpoint of the World Bank.
The following sections will show that these criteria's are closely interlinked because social
capital can be a mediator for sustainability and sustainable infrastructure  projects can serve as
a mediator for the accumulation of social capital.
2.1  THE ORGANIZATIONAL  SETUP OF SOCIAL FUNDS
This  section will take a closer look at what social  funds are and what they do by looking  at
the organizational  setup of a typical social fund. It will help us to identify the different agents
7Narayan  and  Ebbe  (1997a,  p. 33) defines  local organizational  capacity  as the ability  of people  to work
together, trust one another, and organize to solve problems, mobilize resources, resolve conflicts, and
network with others to achieve agreed-upon goals.
12and their interactions inside a social fund. and thereby to identify the different levels where
information and incentive problems can possibly be present.
The role of a social fund is to disburse grants to approved sub-projects in different areas of a
specific country. The fund is setup on the background  of a realized need by a donor or by a
host country. Figure 4 illustrates  the organizational  setup of a social fund. The management
of a social fund is shared by a Steering Committee and an Executive team. The Steering
Committee consists typically of top-level politicians from the host country and
representatives  of the donor. The role of the Steering Committee is to provide the strategy
and policy of the social fund, and to approve  and finance proposed sub-projects. The
Executive team or microproject unit can be seen as the daily management unit of a social
fund. Its main task is to appraise applications for sub-projects  and recommend  which projects
are eligible for funding to the Steering  committee. Another important task taken care of by
the Executive team is to monitor the progress of all proposed and approved sub-projects.
Figure 4 The Organizational Setup of a Social Fund
Steering  Committee  Microprojects  Unit/








Management  iLocal  Community
Committee  (PMC)  *Maintenance
*identify  *Contribute to sub-project
*Design  *Elect PMC
*Designate IA
13A sub-project typically takes place in a local community  be it rehabilitation of a school or
construction of an irrigation system. The role of the local community is maintenance  work on
the project and contributing  to project costs either financially or through in-kind provision of
labor services. The local community must also elect a sub-project management committee
(PMC). Their main tasks are to identify projects that can increase the welfare of the
community, to provide information  for the Executive team, and to designate the
Implementing Agent (IA) of a project. The IA can be either the PMC itself, a NGO, the local
administration, or a private contractor.  As the name indicates  the main task for the IA is the
implementation of the project. In addition, it takes care of the design of the project in
collaboration with the PMC.
The organizational setup shown in Figure 4 works as an illustrator for all the different levels
where trust has a role to play in social funds. Think about the trust game from chapter 1 and
try to figure out the places where this game or a related game is played in the social fund
setting. 8 It is played between  the different units illustrated in the figure (the inter-level) and it
is played inside each of the units (the intra level). It means trust can be a lubricator for
cooperation between the local community,  the IA, the Executive team, and the Steering
Committee. It is obvious that the local community needs to have a certain degree of trust in
the Government and thereby in the Steering Committee for being interested in applying for
funds. This constraint relates to the discussion  of Government credibility in Chapter 1. At the
intra level, trust is crucial between community members in order to help them overcome
dilemmas of collective action. The discussion in this paper will therefore concentrate on trust
at this level, but for the workings  of social funds it is important not to ignore trust at the inter
level. One could also choose to think about social capital and social funds through the lens of
Figure 3. The two management units are providing the governance while the additional
players operate through the civil society box. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is very difficult
8 By related is meant that the problems relating to trust can also be illustrated by a simultaneous game (see
footnote 3) and thereby also be viewed in an n-person setting.
14to analyze social capital in this complex environment. Instead we will look at the relations
between social funds and social capital by the help of our analytical tools from Figure 1.
2.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
For further analysis let us start by defining one of the success criteria's for social funds; that
the provided sub-projects  are sustainable. By sustainability of sub-projects we mean that the
goods and/or the institutions provided by the projects remain functionable and continues to
provide basic services for the beneficiaries over time. In a study on microproject
sustainability  in the Arnenian Social Investment Fund it was found that the sustainability of
proj6cts was a function of three factors
*  the quality of the good produced by the project
*  the appraisal quality
*  an existing active community
Looking at these three factors in the light of the trust game provides a good explanation of
why they influence  project sustainability.  First, if the participating agents in a social fund
initially have a high degree of trust in each other, their initial estimate of the probability  that
their opponents will act trustworthy,  p, will be high. The expected losses by going into
cooperative  actions are therefore smaller than the expected losses faced by communities with
low levels of social capital. A local community with high social capital is therefore more
likely to come together and organize itself and apply for funds to improve the social welfare
of the commuunity.  In an ongoing project and after its completion there are a lot of tasks
which require collective action, one of the most important being maintenance of the facility
created by the project. Here the level of social capital also has a role to play, because higher
level of trust can lead to more cooperation.  It means that there is a possible link between high
social capital communities and active communities, when active communities are defined by
their tradition of self-help and initiative taking.
15Secondly, if the quality of the good produced by the project is high the community  members
will valuate it at a high rate. The high valuation provides better incentives for cooperation on
future maintenance work. This can be illustrated by the trust game in Figure 1. Let TI be an
agent deciding whether or not to take part in the maintenance work. If she chooses  to take
part in the maintenance work without the support of her opponent T2, the cost of doing
maintenance is so high for her, that it would have paid better for her to stay out (i.e. a < 0 in
Figure 1). TI faces the same two types of opponents mentioned in Chapter 1, trustees and
opportunists. Trustees (type 1) are willing to go into maintenance work (their b < 1), while
opportunists (type 2) are not (their b > 1). Let us say thatp percent of the local community  is
trustees and (l-p) percent is opportunists. Now, if the quality of the good produced by the
project is really high it will influence people's pay-offs from being trusting and trustworthy. It
implies that TI gets better incentives for going into maintenance work and T2 types get better
incentives for helping TI with the maintenance work (e.g. the trust-trustworthiness  pay-offs
increases). It means that high quality goods produced by projects can help to reduce the
incentive problem. In addition, by observing a high quality good, Ti obtains information
about the fact that other agents will tend to value the good at a high rate. She can use this
information as an indicator for, that the part of trustworthy players in the population will tend
to be higher, than if the produced good had been of poor quality. It induces TI to be more
trusting, because high quality goods diminish the information problem. In all, high quality
goods produced by the projects lead to higher valuation of the good and thereby to a higher
level of trust. The higher level of trust makes it more profitable for people to cooperate  on
maintenance  work helping the project to be sustainable.
The appraisal quality depends on how well information about possibilities, rights, and
responsibilities is distributed to community members. High quality appraisals provide
community members with better incentives for applying for funds,  because better information
about their opponents in the social fumd  setting and better information about rights,
responsibilities,  and possibilities decreases the amount of risk community members  take
16upon themselves, when entering into the necessary transaction  for the establishment and
running of a sub-project.
This section has thereby shown that the three findings from the Armenian Social Investment
Fund study can be explained from our definition of social capital. But most importantly, it
led us to the statement of our first hypothesis that social capital has a positive impact on
project sustainability.
2.3  THE IMPORTANCE OF SUSTAINABILITY FOR THE ACCUMULATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
In this section we will discuss how to think about the accumulation  of social capital. A good
parameter to look at is p(A), which expresses the proportion of trustworthy people in a given
population, or to say it in another way, the probability that one's opponent is trustworthy.
From our definition of social capital, it is useful to think about the accumulation of social
capital as changes in p, which according to equation 1 changes expectations and thereby the
level of trust. It is then important to ask, what influences p. As discussed in Chapter 1 the
level of information and incentives can influence  p in a static setting. As mentioned
previously, when agents realize the outcomes from strategic interaction, they acquire
information about others behavior. The information  influences agents' expectations about
others behavior. We can think about this change in expectations as changes in p. If agents
realize successful outcomes from being either trusting or trustworthy, meaning that trust is
reciprocated and provide them with welfare improving outcomes, it will tend to have a
positive influence on the share of the population being trustworthy. These thoughts can
actually be incorporated into some interesting models?
Here we will shortly present an equation arising from evolutionary  game theory describing
the dynamics inp. We assume that we have a population of agents meeting randomly and
pairwise in transactions, for example of the type in Table 1. For this setting to work we need
9 For  Bayesian  updates  onp,  see Bower et al., 1997.  For evolutionary  approaches on the dynamics  inp,  see
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Weibull (1995).
17to assume symmetric and simultaneous  play. What is interesting  about the game in Table 1 is
that there are two equilibria, one where both agents are trustworthy and one where both are
opportunists. Which one of the two equilibria we end up with depends on each agent's belief
about the trustworthiness of the other, i.e. onp.  The game is often called the assurance game
in the literature. The game can help to illustrate a possible dynamic for social capital.
Table 1 Simultaneous  trust game
Trustworthy  Opportunist
Trustworthy  10,10  4,8
Opportunist  8,4  5,5
The dynamics inp  can be presented by the following differential equation:
(2)  Pb  = [rJl(T,  p) - l( p, (I - p))] * p
Equation 2 is called the replicator dynamic in the literature. Let us first explain the different
termns  in the equation before going on to talk about the intuition. The term p represents  the
change in the proportion of people being trustworthy. rl(T, p) is the expected  pay-off from
playing trustworthy given the distribution of probabilities,p and (l-p), that agents are
trustworthy and opportunists."' The last term in the bracket is the average pay-off in the
population." 1 Now to the intuition, if agents by playing trustworthy realize a higher pay-off,
than the one they would realize if they played like the population on average, the share of
people being trustworthy will increase over time. Equation 2 thereby captures the fact that p
nses through the successful experiences  by agents of being trustworthy. A higherp is
equivalent to a change in expectations,  where people on average expect their opponents to be
°  In the game in Table I the expected pay-off from being trustworthy is equal  to lO*p + 4(1-p).
18more trustworthy. These changes in expectations means an increase in the level of social
capital.
Now we have presented an equation that explains why successful outcomes of mutual
trustworthiness and thereby cooperation  implies an increase in the level of trust/social capital.
The question then moves onto, which outcomes will be rated as successful. One outcome
which agents definitely will rate as successful is the sustainability of a project. A sustainable
project is provided by cooperative  actions of the local community with support by all the
other external actors in Figure 4. According to Equation 2 social capital is likely to
accumulate  if the benefits from cooperation  are high. When will the benefits tend to be high?
When the projects as a result of cooperation are sustainable. This leads to our second
hypothesis;  sustainability of projects has a positive influence on the accumulation of social
capital.
The success of a project is measurable  by its sustainability. Sustainability creates a high
valued side product, since sustainability  leads to the accumulation of social capital. It means
we end up with a two-sided causality. Social capital increases the chance of sustainability and
sustainability  influence  the accumulation  of social capital in a positive direction. The main
policy issue arising from this conclusion is, what shall be done in a social fund setting in
project areas where the initial level of social capital is very low? The main research issue
arising from this analysis is that there is a need for finding a measure for social capital and go
out in the field and measure social capital in order to test our two hypotheses. We will come
back to that in chapter 4 when discussing different ways to measure social capital.
It is calculated  the same way as the expected  pay-off from being trustworthy, except that in this setting one is
not playing trustworthy with probability 1, but instead with probability p.
19III  WORLD BANK INITIATIVES
A lot of work on social capital is going on at the World Bank.  The two main departments
working on social capital in the Bank are the Social Development Team (SDV) and the
Poverty Division (PRMPO)." 2 Other departments  are also interested in the integration of
social capital in their work.
3.1  THE WORLD BANK'S  DEFINITIONS
The World Bank does not link its work on social capital to a single definition. The closest
they get to a definition is to split the concept up in three parts. The first part is called the
narrow concept, the second part the broader concept, and the third part the encompassing
concept of social capital. 13 The narrow concept of social capital builds on Putnam (1993). He
defines social capital as:
features  of social organization,  such  as trust,  norms  and  networks  that  can improve
the  efficiency of society  by facilitating  coordinated  action  (Putnam,  1993, p.  167).
He sees networks and its associated norms as important  lubricants  of economic  systems,
because it facilitates  cooperation and coordination for the mutual benefits of its members.
Horizontal  networks  are,  according  to  Putnam,  more  important  than  vertical  ones  because
they are better at increasing the costs of defection,  creating norms of reciprocity,  and
improving the flow of information  and communication  (Putnam, 1993, p. 174-175).  It means
12 SDV is part of the Environmentally  and Socially Sustainable Development Network (ESSD) and PRMPO is
part of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM).
3The  definitions are published in Grootaert (1997, p. 78).
20that the institutions included in the narrow definition of social capital are horizontal networks
and norms.
The broader concept builds on the definition  of James Coleman. He writes about social
capital:
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not  a single entity,  but a variety  of
different entities  having two characteristics  in common: They all consists of some
aspect of social structure,  and they facilitate certain  actions of individuals  who are
within the structure  (Coleman, 1990, p. 302).
Coleman includes all aspects of social structures, which help solving collective action
problems. So, in addition to Putnam's structures (institutions), Coleman adds vertical
networks and firms to the broader  definition of social capital.
The Bank's third definition  of social capital, the most encompassing view on social capital, is
inspired by the work of North (1990) and Olson (1982). This definition adds to the broad
definition of social capital the political and social environment influencing  norms and civil
society. This means  that institutions like the government, the political regime, the rule of law,
the court system, and civil and political liberties is included in the definition." 4
Both Putnam and Coleman talk about social capital as a tool to overcome collective action
problems. The social structures  included in their definitions have the potential of doing that.
But, let us ask, why can these structures  help to solve collective action problems? The answer
is obvious, because the structures  can influence the level of trust. It means, that the main
definitions of social capital by Putnam, Coleman and the World Bank capture important
points about social capital, but they seem to include all the social structures which is not a
part of social capital itself, but merely the factors influencing  it. Instead, we propose to stick
to a narrow definition of social capital as trust influencing collective action. It still makes it
4 Note that  by this  definition  the Bank  wants  to include  more  or less  everything  that  goes  on inside  Figure  3.
21possible to talk about different structures like networks, norms, firms, and governments and
their influence on social capital
Why do we propose to stick to this narrow definition? First, it makes the concept less
complex, and thereby easier to analyze and model. Look at an example, where we use the
broad definition of social capital. Over time a society often changes from a traditional society
with small communities  having a limited number of interactions with the outside world to a
modem society with lots of impersonal interactions.  In the literature it is often claimed that
when we move from traditional to modem society a lot of close-knit networks are broken
down and replaced by third-party enforcement by the government or the state (see e.g.
Platteau, 1994a). If we accept this, would we assume that social capital has decreased or
increased? Ones intuition says that it is more or less unaffected. because agents would still
tend to play trustworthy, not in order to nurse their reputation, but merely because of the
sanctions imposed by the third-party enforcer in case of defection. 1' But, according to the
broad definition, one would obviously say that social capital has decreased, since there has
been a decrease in the number of networks, which give agents the incentive to be trustworthy
in order to nurse their own reputation. If we stick to our definition instead, it is more
consistent with the intuition  that social capital is more or less unaffected by the transition
from traditional to modem society.
One would expect that if we look at the most encompassing view on social capital, it is more
likely to show that social capital is unaffected by the change in society, since both networks
and third-party enforcers  are included in that definition. That is a reasonable comment, but
when moving from networks-enforced  trust to government enforced  trust, there is definitely a
change in the power structure of society. 16 This change is likely to influence social capital.
The influence is impossible  to measure from the encompassing definition of social capital,
15 This is of course taking everything  else as being unchanged by the transition, which is highly unlikely The
example, though, is still a good way to illustrate our point.
16 For literature dealing with the influences of power structures on social capital, see Harriss and De Renzio
(1997), Putzel (1997), and Beall (1997).
22but is easier to cope with, if we look at the trust level. This lead us to a second point. Social
capital is easier to measure when we stick to a narrow definition. It is easier to ask and get
good answers  by asking people about trust in other network members and in the government,
than it is to measure norms, laws, networks, and governments as a part of social capital.
Finally, if social capital over the years cannot be put into an economic model our guess is
that it will not have many chances for surviving at least as an economic term. 1 7 The narrower
and less complex we keep the definition of social capital, the easier it will be to incorporate
into a model.
7See Krugman (1995) for a discussion of the main constraint for ideas to be accepted in economics. His claim
is that the main constraint is that ideas should fit into formal models.
23IV  OPERATIONALIZING  SOCIAL CAPITAL
Before launching into the operationalization of social capital, it may be useful to recap its
conceptual definition. Social capital was defined as trust influencing  collective action, and
trust was defined as expectations about the actions of others that have a bearing on ones own
choice of action, when that action is chosen without observing the actions of those others. So,
to find a measure of social capital we need to find an indicator for trust measured as
expectations  about others' actions. As mentioned in Chapter 1 those expectations is a
function of the level of information about others, especially about their pay-offs.
A good estimator for social capital was proposed in Chapter 1 and 2 by the probability
measure p. It measures the probability that ones opponent  is trustworthy, or said in another
way the proportion of people in a given area (population),  who are trustworthy. A measure of
this kind is actually available, but only at the country level and for a limited number of
countries.8 It stems from the World Values Surveys from 1981-84  and 1990-93.  It is a
qualitative survey asking people all over the world about their values and norms. One of the
questions was Generally  speaking will you say that most  people can be trusted, or that  you
can't be too careful in dealing with  people? This question then led to the construction of a
variable measuring the proportion of people in a given country which answered that most
people can be trusted. This is definitely a good indicator for our variable  p from earlier
chapters.
This indicator for social capital has also been used in the literature on social capital. Knack
and Keefer (1997) used it to demonstrate that countries with a more equal income
distribution, higher income, less corruption, more human capital, and an ethnically
18 The sample includes 29 countries. For a closer look at countries included in the sample see Knack and
Keefer, 1997, p. 1285.
24homogenous population tend to have higher levels of social capital. La Porta et al. (1997) test
the influence of trust on other variables like government efficiency,  participation, and social
efficiency and concludes  that trust has a positive influence on all three variables.
The major drawback  of this measure of trust is that it is a subjective  evaluation by people,
which always bears the danger of providing wTong  answers. To limit this measurement error
the question is stated as objective as possible, i.e., people are not asked about their own
trustworthiness, but about others'.
Putnam's proxy for social capital is the density of voluntary organizations  in a given area.
The idea is that these organizations  provide people with information about their counterparts
and give them better incentives for acting trustworthy. Therefore, more organizations  means
more trust. Paldam and Svendsen (1998) propose a method to check Putnam's proxy for
consistency. First, interview people and ask them about the number of organizations  they
belong to. Afterwards, identify the organizations  and find out how many members they have.
This will give two estimates for the density of voluntary organizations.  If the two estimates
give the same results we have a good indicator for the density of voluntary organizations,  if
not, we know that there are some measurement  errors, which need to be corrected.
This indicator for social capital also has a major drawback.  First, estimating the density of
voluntary organizations  on the macro level makes it difficult to control for negative social
networks like the Mafia and organizations gaining access to rent seeking.' 9 Fukuayma, in one
of his studies, tries to limit this problem by assigning weights to different organizations, such
that one can give negative weights to negative social networks (Fukuyama, 1997). Although
there are good intentions in doing so, the constructed proxy will still have its limitations,
since the weights are very difficult to estimate. A second problem with Putnam's proxy is
that Knack and Keefer are able to reject the hypothesis that a higher density of voluntary
organizations improves economic performance  in their cross-country study based on the
19 For a theorization of the harmful effect of rent-seeking organizations,  see Olson, 1982
25World Values Surveys (Knack and Keefer, 1997,  pp. 1272-73). The opposite effects of
positive and negative social networks can explain their findings.
Putnamns proxy will tend to work better in small homogeneous areas, because it is easier to
avoid negative networks and power mechanism  in these areas. On this smaller scale Narayan
and Pritchett (1  997b) constructed an index measuring,  the density of organizations and the
quality of these organizations  in 87 communities  in Tanzania. 20 They found that this indicator
of social capital influences  household income by 20 to 30 percent.
Different ways to measure social capital has been followed in the literature, but nearly all of
them is a variant of either Putnam's proxy or the indicator from the World Values survey.
This review of different ways to measure social capital lead us into the question of how to
measure it in relation to social funds, and especially which approach to follow in order to test
our two hypotheses from Chapter 2.
4.1  HOW TO MEASURE SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RELATION TO SOCIAL FUNDS
Following the conceptual definition of social capital and the link of it to social funds this
section will describe a reasonable approach to follow in order to measure social capital in
social fund settings. To test our theory of mutual causality between sustainability of social
fund projects and social capital the following approach would be reasonable:
A. measure initial social capital through qualitative interviews asking people in project and
non-project  areas Generally speaking will you say that most people  can be trusted,  or that
you  can 't be too careful in dealing with people?  (the trust  question)
B. measure social capital in the same way just after the completion of the subprojects
C. measure social capital x years after completion together with measures of project
sustainability
20 The quality of a group is measured  by how heterogeneous,  how horizontal,  and how well  it is functioning
26This procedure will give us three measures of social capital, initial social capital SC 1,
intermediate social capital SCM,  and final social capital SCF,  plus a measure of sustainability
S, for each project area included in our sample. For the non-project areas we will of course
only have the three measures of social capital. From these we can construct variables
measuring changes in social capital through the project cycle:
A SC,=  SCM- SC,
A SC2 = SCF  - SCM
A SC3= A SC2+ A SC' = SCF_  SCI
We can then test our hypotheses about the causalities between social capital and
sustainability  by estimating a simultaneous equation model of the form
S = f(SCI,  X)
A  SC = f(S, X)
where X represents a vector of exogenous variables influencing the change in social capital
and sustainability. Or we can simply get an idea about the validity of the hypotheses by
looking at the correlation coefficients  between the variables.
In addition, we will be able to measure if communities in project areas have a significant
higher improvement  in social capital over the project cycle than non-project communities. It
will, together with the analysis of correlations  between sustainability and social capital
accumulation,  give us an idea of whether or not social fund projects matter for social capital
accumulation.
Now does the Bank already have some secondary data, which can be used as an indicator for
initial level of social capital in the areas or countries, where social funds have existed in five
27to ten years? Unfortunately, none of the existing data sets reviewed for this were contained
indicators for social capital. 21
An alternative approach of measuring the initial level of social capital is, through
questionnaires or historical analysis, to try to reconstruct the level of social capital in project
areas five to ten years ago. The measure one ends up with will be more unreliable than the
measure for the current level of social capital, since answers to questions about the situation
five to ten years ago is not as accurate as answers to questions about the present state. But, it
is better to have some measure of initial social capital than having none.
The data on social capital from the World Values Survey does not give us any idea about the
level of social capital in the countries where social fund projects are present. This is because
none of the 29 countries included in the sample coincide with the countries where there are
social fund projects. Even if there were, the chances are good that this measure of social
capital will be too aggregated  to give any meaning for its level in a sub-project area. The
only way forward is to start collecting data from now on, and analyze them following a
procedure like the one sketched above.
The World Development  Report (2001) will be on poverty. It is of special interest that social
capital surveys for 30 countries will be used as one piece of background material for WDR
2001. The countries which will be included in the sample are not settled yet, but Ghana and
Uganda will definitely be two of them. A pilot survey on social capital is already being
performed in Ghana by Ghana Statistical Services, GSS. They have constructed a
questionnaire  with some interesting  questions which can be used to test our hypotheses about
social fund projects. The most relevant questions from the questionnaire for our purposes are
listed below:
21 LSMS household surveys for Albania, Ghana, Guyana,  Nicaragua, Peru and Romania,  together with a
questionnaire from a priority survey for Zambia.
28*  Generally speaking,  would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
*  Do you think people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair?
*  Now I want to ask you how much you trust different groups of people. As I
read each group please tell me if you feel you can trust all of the people in that
group, most, some, or none of the people in that group (7 different groups
listed).
*  Next, I'm going to read a list of institutions. For each please tell me how
competent  and efficient it is. First-- would you say it is very competent and
efficient,  somewhat competent and efficient, neither competent and efficient
nor incompetent and inefficient, somewhat incompetent and inefficient, or
very incompetent and inefficient (13 institutions listed).
A good approach  to follow for social funds would be to incorporate social capital surveys of
the same type as the ones mentioned  above and include them into on going social funds
research. But since the questions from above only look at social capital from a static point of
view there is a need to supplement with questions trying to reconstruct previous social
capital, or to repeat the surveys over a certain time frame. Then the questions and subsequent
analyses can be used to test our hypotheses about social fund projects and social capital.
29V  CONCLUSION
The main focus of development projects has moved away from the creation of employment
opportunities and infrastructure  towards establishing participatory approaches involving  the
beneficiaries into the development process. This change is caused by a realization  that by
involving vulnerable groups into the identification, implementation, and maintenance  process
the success rate of projects will increase and at the same time empower  the beneficiaries to
take better care of their development needs in the future.
This paper has clarified that this realization is closely connected to the concept social capital.
Two hypotheses were stated for this purpose:
1. Higher social capital means better chances for project sustainability.
2. Sustainability of projects has a positive influence on the level of social capital.
Through  the lens of social fund projects different ways to measure social capita] and to test
these hypotheses were reviewed, and the importance of a definition and a theory for social
capital was discussed.
If empirical data confirms  our hypotheses, there is a need to increase our knowledge about
social capital. It is of central importance  to build and test a dynamic theory of the concept
that can provide us with some recommendations on how to influence the level of social
capital. An answer to that question is of crucial importance to social funds projects and
development  in general. Areas with low levels of social capital are likely to include some of
the most vulnerable  people. If we choose not to provide projects in these areas, because they
do not seem to be successful, these people will be marginalized even more.
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